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Abstract
E-system, a new commerce model, is a new era for
business direction. When a principal is absent (goes on
an errand or on leave), a well-designed deputy system
keeps the business operations working. In the network
world, identity verification and any substitute for
traditional signature can be done by digital signature [1].
Deputy signature guarantees the existence of deputy
system in e-system.
Current deputy mechanism
addresses the verification of deputy signature. No
research has been done on the prevention of the illegal
use of deputy system when the principal returns and the
deputy system is not in use. We propose a mechanism
to solve the problem of illegal use of deputy system
when the power of deputy system is not legally “ON.”
Key words: information security, digital signature,
deputy signature.

1. Introduction
In the information era, information technology is
an important tool to support all work. The popularity
of network changes the methods of information transfer
and speeds up the development of e-commerce. As a
new model of commerce, e-commercialization is a
competitive goal for all business users.
A
well-designed deputy system is helpful to business
operations in non-network system and is imperative in
network system.
In a network environment, in addition to verifying
the identity, digital signature can also be used to
substitute for the traditional handwritten signature.
During the principal’s absence, deputy signature keeps
the system running and the security of private key as
well. The characteristics of deputy signature are as
follows: private, identifiable, secure, and undeniable.
Current deputy mechanism addresses the verification of
deputy signature. No research has been done on the
prevention of the illegal use of deputy system when
deputy system is not in use. We propose a mechanism
to solve the problem of illegal use of deputy system
when the power of deputy system is not legally “ON.”
Our scheme provides a delegation time schedule for the
receiver to solve the associated problem of deputy
signature. Unauthorized deputy will be ruled out once
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the principal returns and the deputy’s authority has
lapsed.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Literature
review is in Section 2. Section 3 introduces our
scheme. In Section 4, we analyze the security of our
scheme. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. Literature Review
Digital signature fulfills the requirement of
signature in network environment and enhances the
feasibility of e-commerce.
In the E-era, the
un-deniability of digital signature enables e-documents
to be widely and legally accepted. The principal uses
his/her private key to sign and send documents. The
receivers verify the documents by public key. When
one cannot sign documents personally, deputy signature
enables the deputy to keep the system working without
using the original private key.
Mambo et al [2,3]
propose deputy signature in 1996. Deputy signature
allows deputy to sign documents with equal efficacy.
In general, deputy signature has properties as follows
[11]:
A. Distinguish-ability: The difference between deputy
signature and original signature is distinguishable.
B. Unforgeability: No one else can forge deputy
signature other than the real deputy.
C. Verifiability: The receiver(s) can believe that the
principal agrees to deputy signature for the
documents.
D. Un-deniability: deputy cannot deny deputy signature.
Unfortunately, the Mambo deputy signature is
deniable. Zhang [4], Lee et al [5], Sun and Hsieh [6]
solve this problem in their schemes .

3. Our Scheme
3.1 Registration
First, firm should set up a system center. The
manager of system center chooses a big prime p [7,8,9]
to satisfy the following equations:

p = 4 p1 q1 + 1

where p1 , q1 are big primes.
Let n = p1q1
Then, select a number g modulo p with order n, i.e.,
p
q
gn ≡ 1 (mod p), g 1 ≠ 1(mod p ) , g 1 ≠ 1(mod p ) .

{p,n,g} is the public key of the system center. {p1 , q1 }
is private key.
*
The principal (hereafter A) selects a number x A ∈ Z n ,
calculates:

y A ≡ g x A (mod p ) ………(1)
and registers to system center. {y A } {x A } are the

{TA , D1 , E1} and
{m, D2 , E2 } with

Step 3: Sending deputy certificate
the

digital

signature

message m to a receiver C as shown in
Diagram 2.

public key of A and private key, respectively.
If A is to assign B as his/her deputy to sign documents
Select d 2 ∈ Z n ，
calculate D2 ≡ g d (mod p )
and E2 ≡ mxB + d 2 D2 (mod p )
*

[

]

during TA = t1 ,t 2 .

xB ∈ Z n* ，

B selects a number

2

Sending deputy certificate {TA , D1 , E1}
and message {m, D2 , E2 }

calculates:

yB ≡ g x B (mod p ) ………(2)
and registers to system center, where {y B } {x B } are
the public key of

Receiver C

Deputy B

B and private key, respectively.

3.2 Delegation

Diagram 2: Running of Deputy signature

Step 1: A selects a number

d1 ∈ Z n* and calculates:

D1 ≡ g

d1

(mod p ) ………(3)

3.4 Verification of deputy signature
The receiver C verifies:

Step 2: Calculate:

y B + T A ≡ x A D1 + d1 E1 (mod n ) ..……(4)

Step 3: Send deputy certificate {TA , D1 , E1 } to B as
shown in Diagram 1.

g y B +TA ≡ y0D1 D1E1 (mod p ) ………(7)
g E2 ≡ y Bm D2D2 (mod p ) …………(8)
If the equations above are valid, accept deputy B . If
not, reject.

Select d ∈ Z ，
Calculate：
1

D1 ≡ g

d1

*
n

(mod p )

yB + TA ≡ x A D1 + d1E1 (mod n )

Theorem 1: If A is honest, Eqs.(7)(8) are valid.
Proof:
To have base g for the both sides of Eq.(4) and obtain:

g y B +TA ≡ g x A D1 g d1E1 (mod p )
≡ y AD1 D1E1 (mod p )

Sending deputy certificate：
{TA , D1 , E1}

Deputy B

4. Security Analyses

Principal A

According to Eqs.(1)(3)
For the same reason, having base g for both sides of
Eq.(6) and obtaining:

Diagram 1: Delegating deputy and sending deputy

g E2 ≡ g mxB g d 2 D2 (mod p )
≡ y Bm D2D2 (mod p )

certificate

According to Eqs.(2)(5), the theorem 1 is proven.

If B is going to sign on the message m during
deputy time,
*
Step 1: Select a number d 2 ∈ Z n and calculate:

Theorem 2: The difficulty of forging Eq.(1) is the
complexity of discrete logarithm
Proof:
ElGamal [10] has proven that following equations to be
discrete logarithm:

Step 2: Calculate:

Comparing Eq.(7) and Eq.(9), we find that if

3.3 Generation of deputy signature

D2 ≡ g d 2 (mod p ) ………(5)

E 2 ≡ mx B + d 2 D2 (mod p ) ……….(6)

g m ≡ y r r s (mod p ) ………(9)

y B + TA ≡ m(mod n ) ………(10)

then Eq.(7) is similar to Eq.(9).
Namely, the
complexity of Eq.(9) is discrete logarithm. So is
Eq.(10). On the contrary, if Eq.(10) is the problem of
discrete logarithm, So is Eq.(9). In addition, the
complexity of forging Eq.(8) is at least equal to the
complexity of Eq.(7). The proof is similar and omitted.
Thus, theorem 2 is proven.
From the two theorems above, we know that if an
attacker (A or B) is going to invade our system, he/she
has to solve the complexity of discrete logarithm.

5. Conclusion
In recent years, along with the development of
network, e-commerce is expanding rapidly. In addition
to overturning the traditional model of transactions, this
new business activity also provides ample business
opportunity. Network is used for business activities
and generates e-business. For e-business, information
security is an important topic. In a non-e environment,
deputy system can be done by written delegation
certificate. In an e-environment, a trustable deputy
signature is needed. Our deputy signature has the
advantage of timing for the verification of deputy
signature. No illegal deputy can be accepted once the
principal returns and the deputy’s authority has lapsed.
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